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GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
  The question we must answer on this appeal is whether a 
sentence for money laundering under § 2S1.1 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines should be based on the total value of the funds 
involved in that offense or should it be based on the actual loss 
sustained by the victims.  We reject Thompson's "actual loss" 
argument which is based on the measurement of the sentence for 
offenses involving fraud and deceit.  See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1;  
United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1991).  We hold 
instead that in imposing a sentence for money laundering pursuant 
to U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1, the district court should determine its 
sentence based on the total value of the funds involved.      
 
     I 
 Appellant Roscoe Thompson ("Thompson") appeals the 
sentence imposed after he pled guilty to the charges of money 
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)1 and 
conspiracy to defraud a financial institution, 18 U.S.C.  
                     
1.  18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1)(B)(i) provides as follows: 
 
 Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a 
financial transaction represents the proceeds of some 
form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to 
conduct such a financial transaction which in fact 
involves the proceeds of unspecified unlawful 
 activity-- 
 
 . . . .  
  (B)  knowing that the transaction is designed in 
whole or in part-- 
   (i)  to conceal or disguise the nature, 
location, the source, the ownership or the control of 
the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, or  
 . . . .  
 
 shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 
or twice the value of the property involved in the 
transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment of 
not more than twenty years, or both.  
§ 1344,2 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.3  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2).  On 
appeal, Thompson argues that the district court's calculation of 
his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2) is inconsistent with 
this Court's holding in United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521 (3d 
Cir. 1991).            
                     
2.  18 U.S.C. § 1344 provides as follows: 
 
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or 
artifice-- 
 
 (1) to defraud a financial institution;  or 
 
 (2)  to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, 
assets, securities, or other property owned by, or 
under the custody or control of, a financial 
institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations or promises; 
 
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more 
than 30 years, or both. 
3.  18 U.S.C. § 371 provides in relevant part: 
 
  If two or more persons conspire either to commit 
any offense against the United States, or to defraud 
the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner 
or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do 
any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each 
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for 
not more than five years, or both. 
 
     II 
 The essential facts of this case are not in dispute.  
Thompson, Victor Thompson ("Victor") and co-defendant Benjamin 
Garland ("Garland") together intercepted and diverted funds that 
investors mailed to the New York securities firm of J.P. Morgan 
 
 
Securities, Inc. ("J.P. Morgan").  Their plan was executed in the 
following manner.  During the period from July 18, 1991 through 
December 2, 1991, Victor, who was a J.P. Morgan employee, 
intercepted thirty-four checks sent to J.P. Morgan by various 
people throughout the United States.  Victor forwarded these 
checks to Garland in Tarpon Springs, Florida, who mailed the 
stolen checks to the appellant Thompson in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania. 
 On October 9, 1991, Thompson opened an account at 
Pittsburgh National Bank (now PNC Bank) under the fictitious 
business name of J.P.M. Utility Auditors, Inc. ("JPM").  Thompson 
used the alias of Rudolph Sinclair to create the account.  On the 
same day Thompson obtained a telephone answering service in JPM's 
name.   
 Between October 10, 1991, and December 6, 1991, 
Thompson deposited thirty-four stolen checks with a total value 
of $352,220.50 into JPM's checking account.  The conspirators 
withdrew the funds by wire transfers, checks and automatic teller 
machine transactions.  By means of these withdrawals, Thompson 
and Garland diverted the stolen funds to a series of other 
accounts with PNC Bank, Barnett Bank, Citibank and Charles 
Schwab, a discount brokerage firm.   
 Investigators from PNC Bank became aware of these 
illicit activities in January, 1992.  PNC froze the funds that 
remained in the accounts and thereby prevented the withdrawal of 
 
 
$99,561.27 of the $352,220.50 that Thompson had stolen and 
deposited.  These funds were eventually returned to the J.P. 
Morgan investors who were the victims of the scheme.  Of the 
stolen funds, $252,659.23 was not recovered. 
 On April 15, 1993, a federal grand jury returned an 
eighty-two count indictment against Thompson and Garland.4  Under 
an agreement with the Government, Thompson pled guilty to Count 
One (conspiracy to defraud) and Count Fifty-One (money 
laundering) of the indictment.  Thompson acknowledged committing 
the crimes charged in the remaining counts of the indictment, and 
stipulated that the conduct alleged in the entire indictment 
could be considered by the district court in imposing a sentence.  
Thompson also accepted the responsibility for paying restitution 
in the amount of $352,220.50. 
                     
4.  The indictment enumerated the following charges:  Count One 
charged the defendants with conspiracy to defraud a financial 
institution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371;  Counts Two through 
Twelve charged them with possession of forged securities in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513;  Counts Thirteen through Twenty-
Eight charged them with bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1344;  Counts Twenty-Nine through Thirty-One charged them with 
wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343;  Count Thirty-Two 
charged Thompson with the use of a fictitious identity in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1342;  Counts Thirty-Seven through 
Forty-Seven charged Thompson and Garland with interstate 
transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2314;  Counts Forty-Eight through Fifty charged the defendants 
with mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341;  Counts Fifty-
One through Eighty-One charged them with money laundering in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956;  and Count Eighty-Two charged them 
with money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. 
 
 
 Under the applicable money laundering provisions of 
U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a)(2), Thompson's base offense level was 20.  
The district court found that the value of the funds involved in 
the money laundering scheme was $352,220.50.  This resulted in a 
three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(D).  
Thompson received a three point downward adjustment for 
acceptance of responsibility.  The district court also found that 
Thompson had a criminal history category of III. 
 After considering a range of 41 to 51 months, the 
district court sentenced Thompson to fifty months in prison on 
both the conspiracy and the money laundering counts, to be served 
concurrently, to be followed by two concurrent three year terms 
of supervised release.  App. 100.  Thompson was ordered to pay 
$252,693.23 in restitution and a $100 special assessment to the 
court.  This appeal followed.  
 
        III 
 Thompson challenges the district court's interpretation 
of the Sentencing Guidelines.  The district court's 
interpretation of the Guidelines is an issue of law subject to 
plenary review.   United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d 192, 196 (3d 
Cir. 1993).  Section 2S1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines 
(Laundering of Monetary Instruments) provides, among other 
things, for a two level increase in offense level if the value of 
the funds laundered exceed a $200,000. U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(C).  
 
 
The Sentencing Guidelines prescribe a three level increase in 
offense level when the value of the funds laundered exceed 
$350,000.  U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(D). 
 Thompson argues that the district court erred by 
including the full $352,220.50 in calculating the "value of the 
funds" prescribed in U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 and should have excluded 
the $99,561.27 that was frozen by PNC Bank and subsequently 
returned to the J.P. Morgan investors.  Thus, Thompson contends 
that the district court should have considered only the sum of 
$252,659.23 in calculating his sentence.  If this were so, 
Thompson's offense level would be reduced by one point, which 
would accordingly result in the reduction of his sentence. 
 Thompson's argument that the district court applied the 
Guidelines incorrectly is premised upon his interpretation of 
this Court's decision in United States v. Kopp, supra.  Kopp 
involved a defendant who made fraudulent representations to 
obtain a $13,750,000 bank loan.  Kopp pled guilty to procuring a 
loan by fraudulent misrepresentations, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1344.   921 F.2d at 522.  At sentencing, the district court 
applied the fraud and deceit provisions of U.S.S.G.  
§ 2F1.1(b)(1).5  Section 2F1.1 determines the sentence by 
reference to the measurable "loss" that results from the fraud 
and deceit. 
                     
5.  Section 2F1.1 (Fraud and Deceit) of the Sentencing Guidelines 
provides, in relevant part, that: 
 
. . . .  
 
 
 Although it was uncontroverted that Kopp made 
fraudulent representations to obtain the loan, he did offer the 
bank a deed as collateral.  The bank ultimately sold the property 
for $14,500,000, $750,000 more than the face value of the loan.  
Id. at 524.  Nonetheless, the district court calculated the 
"loss" under §2F1.1(b)(1) at $13,750,000, the full face value of 
the loan.  We vacated the judgment and sentence of the district 
court, holding that in fraudulent loan application cases "the 
loss is the amount of loss not repaid at the time the offense is 
discovered, reduced by the amount the lending institution has 
recovered, or can expect to recover, from the assets pledged to 
secure the loan."  Id. at 535.     
 Kopp is clearly distinguishable from the present case.  
As contrasted with Kopp, the present appeal concerns the 
application of Sentencing Guideline § 2S1.1(b)(2) not  
§ 2F1.1(b)(1).  Section 2S1.1(b)(2) computes the base level 
according to the "value of the funds" involved in the money 
laundering scheme, not according to the "loss" incurred.  As the 
Tenth Circuit has held, when considering the impact of fraud on 
individual victims it is the loss which governs the measure of 
(..continued) 
(b)(1) If the loss exceeded $2,000, increase the offense level as 
follows: 
 
 . . . . 
 (A)  $2,000 or less               no increase  
 . . . .  




the sentence imposed, whereas in considering a money laundering 
offense such as the one here, the amount of the loss is not the 
measure of the sentence.  Rather, it is the value of the funds 
involved in the money laundering transaction.  This is so because 
"[t]he harm from such a transaction does not generally fall upon 
an individual, but falls upon society in general.  Thus, the 
measure of harm under § 2S1.1 is the total amount of the funds 
involved."  United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 576 (10th 
Cir. 1992).    
 Although the Commentary to § 2S1.1 does not expressly 
define "the value of the funds," it states that "[t]he amount of 
money involved is included as a factor because it is an indicator 
of the magnitude of the criminal enterprise, and the extent to 
which the defendant aided in the enterprise."  The Commentary to 
§ 2S1.1 makes no reference to "loss" and contains no cross-
references to § 2F1.1.  The Commentary's statement that the 
"amount of money involved is included as a factor" can only refer 
to the "value of the funds" language of § 2S1.1(b)(2).  The 
Commentary's reference to "the amount of funds involved" in the 
money laundering scheme and § 2S1.1(b)(2)'s reference to "the 
value of the funds" hence should be read synonymously.   
 It is uncontroverted that Thompson deposited 
$352,220.50 in laundered funds in PNC Bank in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §1956.  The sum of $352,220.50 is plainly the "amount of 
 
 
money involved" in this case and gives the clearest "indicator of 
the magnitude of the criminal enterprise."   
 The Money Laundering Control Act's6 ("the Act") 
reference to "value" also supports our interpretation of "the 
value of the funds" under § 2S1.1(b)(2).  Among other things, the 
sentencing provisions of that Act permit a district court to 
impose a sentence of "twice the value of the property involved in 
the transaction."  Under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(3), "The term 
`transaction' . . . with respect to a financial institution 
includes the deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts . . . 
through, or to a financial institution, by whatever means 
effected."  These are the very acts to which Thompson pled 
guilty.  Nowhere in the Act does the term "loss" appear.    
 The provisions of the Act to which we have referred 
look only to the value of the laundered funds that were 
transacted by and through a financial institution.  Neither the 
Act nor U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2) provide for any mitigation of 
punishment if the victims of the money laundering scheme recoup 
some, or even all, of their losses.  Accordingly, we hold that 
the calculation of "the value of the funds" under § 2S1.1(b)(2) 
includes the aggregate of all funds involved in the money 
laundering scheme without regard to either the "actual loss" 
which the victim suffered or the return of any monies to the 
victims.  In the instant case, the district court determined that 
                     
6.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57. 
 
 
the value of the funds involved in Thompson's unlawful activities 
was $352,220.50. 
 Our reading and our interpretation of the money 
laundering and fraud provisions of the Guidelines is consistent 
with that of other courts that have addressed this issue.  Every 
Court of Appeals that has reviewed sentences imposed under 
U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2) and discussed sentences imposed under 
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1) has held that "value of funds" under  
§ 2S1.1 is not limited to or the same as the concept of "loss", 
which is the measure of culpability found in § 2F1.1.  See United 
States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 576 (10th Cir. 1992);  United 
States v. Taylor, 984 F.2d 298, 303 (9th Cir. 1993);  United 
States v. Tansley, 986 F.2d 880, 884 (5th Cir. 1993);  United 
States v. Barrios, 993 F.2d 1522, 1524 (11th Cir. 1993).   
 Because we reject Thompson's contention that  
§ 2S1.1(b)(2)'s reference to "the value of the funds" relates to 
the actual loss suffered by victims of the money laundering  
scheme, we will affirm the district court's sentence of May 25, 
1994 imposed upon Thompson. 
